Results for 'Jago Van Soom'

978 found
Order:
  1.  34
    Sleep Restores The Potential To Undergo Learning Induced Increases Of Corticomotor Excitability: New Evidence In Line With The Synaptic Downscaling Hypothesis.De Beukelaar Toon, Van Soom Jago & Wenderoth Nicole - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  2.  31
    A Day Awake Attenuates Motor Learning-Induced Increases in Corticomotor Excitability.Toon T. de Beukelaar, Jago Van Soom, Reto Huber & Nicole Wenderoth - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10.
  3.  21
    Exploring the Context of Fitness to Practise Concerns About Social Workers in England: Explanations Beyond Individuals.Ann Gallagher, Sarah Banks, Robert Jago, Magdalena Zasada, Zubin Austin & Anna van der Gaag - 2020 - Ethics and Social Welfare 14 (2):187-203.
    There is a disproportionate number of complaints about social workers in England to the Health and Care Professionals Council (HCPC) as compared with the other health care professionals regulated by HCPC. This paper discusses findings from interviews and focus groups that formed part of a mixed methods study that aimed to find out the reasons for complaints and the strategies that may reduce complaints. Four themes were identified: social work as an evolving profession; social work involves challenging practice; social work (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Mechanisms, determination and the metaphysics of neuroscience.Patrice Soom - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (3):655-664.
    In this paper, I evaluate recently defended mechanistic accounts of the unity of neuroscience from a metaphysical point of view. Considering the mechanistic framework in general , I argue that explanations of this kind are essentially reductive . The reductive character of mechanistic explanations provides a sufficiency criterion, according to which the mechanism underlying a certain phenomenon is sufficient for the latter. Thus, the concept of supervenience can be used in order to describe the relation between mechanisms and phenomena . (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  5.  45
    (1 other version)Psycho-neural reduction through functional sub-types.Patrice Soom, Christian Sachse & Michael Esfeld - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (1-2):7-26.
    The paper argues that a functional reduction of ordinary psychology to neuropsychology is possible by means of constructing fine-grained functional, mental sub-types that are coextensive with neuropsychological types. We establish this claim by means of considering as examples the cases of the disconnection syndrome and schizophrenia. We point out that the result is a conservative reduction, vindicating the scientific quality of the mental types of ordinary psychology by systematically linking them with neuroscience. That procedure of conservative reduction by means of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6.  20
    From Psychology to Neuroscience: A New Reductive Account.Patrice Soom - 2011 - De Gruyter.
    This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality.Mark Jago - 2014 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Mark Jago presents an original philosophical account of meaningful thought: in particular, how it is meaningful to think about things that are impossible. We think about impossible things all the time. We can think about alchemists trying to turn base metal to gold, and about unfortunate mathematicians trying to square the circle. We may ponder whether God exists; and philosophers frequently debate whether properties, numbers, sets, moral and aesthetic qualities, and qualia exist. In many philosophical or mathematical debates, when (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   76 citations  
  8. What Truth Is.Mark Jago - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Mark Jago presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is true. By coming to an understanding of this relation, he argues, we gain better insight into the metaphysics of truth. The first part of the book discusses the property being true, and how we should understand it in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  9. Being Positive About Negative Facts.Mark Jago & Stephen Barker - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.
    Negative facts get a bad press. One reason for this is that it is not clear what negative facts are. We provide a theory of negative facts on which they are no stranger than positive atomic facts. We show that none of the usual arguments hold water against this account. Negative facts exist in the usual sense of existence and conform to an acceptable Eleatic principle. Furthermore, there are good reasons to want them around, including their roles in causation, chance-making (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  10. Truthmaker Semantics for Relevant Logic.Mark Jago - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (4):681-702.
    I develop and defend a truthmaker semantics for the relevant logic R. The approach begins with a simple philosophical idea and develops it in various directions, so as to build a technically adequate relevant semantics. The central philosophical idea is that truths are true in virtue of specific states. Developing the idea formally results in a semantics on which truthmakers are relevant to what they make true. A very natural notion of conditionality is added, giving us relevant implication. I then (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  11. A short argument for truthmaker maximalism.Mark Jago - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):40-44.
    Each truth has a truthmaker: an entity in virtue of whose existence that truth is true. So say truthmaker maximalists. Arguments for maximalism are hard to find, whereas those against are legion. Most accept that maximalism comes at a significant cost, which many judge to be too high. The scales would seem to be balanced against maximalism. Yet, as I show here, maximalism can be derived from an acceptable premise which many will pre-theoretically accept.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  12. Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese 198 (S8):1981-1999.
    I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will offer an account based on our knowledge of the natures, or essencess, of things. I will argue that essences need not be viewed as metaphysically bizarre entities; that we can conceptualise and refer to (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  13. Which Fitch?Mark Jago - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):436-439.
    Jago uses a Fitch-style argument in an attempt to demonstrate that every truth has a truthmaker. But Trueman shows that there is a parallel argument, this time to the conclusion that no truth has a truthmaker. Since we cannot accept both, we must ditch at least one Fitch. But which? Keywords: Truth, truthmaking, truthmaker maximalism, Fitch paradox, Robert Trueman.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.
    Impossible worlds are representations of impossible things and impossible happenings. They earn their keep in a semantic or metaphysical theory if they do the right theoretical work for us. As it happens, a worlds-based account provides the best philosophical story about semantic content, knowledge and belief states, cognitive significance and cognitive information, and informative deductive reasoning. A worlds-based story may also provide the best semantics for counterfactuals. But to function well, all these accounts need use of impossible and as well (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  15. Truthmaker Semantics in Linguistics (3rd edition).Mark Jago - forthcoming - In Hilary Nesi & Petar Milin (eds.), International Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier.
    Truthmaker semantics is a recent development in formal and philosophical semantics, with similar motivation and scope to possible worlds semantics. The technical background is rather different, however, and results in a more fine-grained hyperintensional notion of content, allowing us to distinguish between classically equivalent propositions. After briefly introducing the main ideas, this entry will describe the technical apparatus of state spaces and the central notions of content and partial content. It will then outline applications of truthmaker semantics in language, logic, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Hyperintensional propositions.Mark Jago - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):585-601.
    Propositions play a central role in contemporary semantics. On the Russellian account, propositions are structured entities containing particulars, properties and relations. This contrasts sharply with the sets-of-possible-worlds view of propositions. I’ll discuss how to extend the sets-of-worlds view to accommodate fine-grained hyperintensional contents. When this is done in a satisfactory way, I’ll argue, it makes heavy use of entities very much like Russellian tuples. The two notions of proposition become inter-definable and inter-substitutable: they are not genuinely distinct accounts of how (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  17. Logical information and epistemic space.Mark Jago - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.
    Gaining information can be modelled as a narrowing of epistemic space . Intuitively, becoming informed that such-and-such is the case rules out certain scenarios or would-be possibilities. Chalmers’s account of epistemic space treats it as a space of a priori possibility and so has trouble in dealing with the information which we intuitively feel can be gained from logical inference. I propose a more inclusive notion of epistemic space, based on Priest’s notion of open worlds yet which contains only those (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  18. (1 other version)The Problem of Rational Knowledge.Mark Jago - 2013 - Erkenntnis (S6):1-18.
    Real-world agents do not know all consequences of what they know. But we are reluctant to say that a rational agent can fail to know some trivial consequence of what she knows. Since every consequence of what she knows can be reached via chains of trivial cot be dismissed easily, as some have attempted to do. Rather, a solution must give adequate weight to the normative requirements on rational agents’ epistemic states, without treating those agents as mathematically ideal reasoners. I’ll (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  19.  37
    Reality Making.Mark Jago (ed.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
    What makes up reality, and how? What kinds of entity are fundamental to reality, and how do dependent entities depend on the fundamental ones? How does one entity metaphysically ground another? These questions are central to contemporary metaphysics. The papers in this collection, written by a new generation of metaphysicians, address these and related questions. They investigate the metaphysical concepts of grounding and fundamentality, and the relationship between the fundamental and all the other parts of reality. Together, these papers represent (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  20. Essence and the Grounding Problem.Mark Jago - 2016 - In Reality Making. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 99-120.
    Pluralists about coincident entities say that distinct entities may be spatially coincident throughout their entire existence. The most pressing issue they face is the grounding problem. They say that coincident entities may differ in their persistence conditions and in the sortals they fall under. But how can they differ in these ways, given that they share all their microphysical properties? What grounds those differences, if not their microphysical properties? Do those differences depend only on the way we conceptualise those objects? (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  21. Advanced Modalizing Problems.Mark Jago - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):627-642.
    I present an internal problem for David Lewis’s genuine modal realism. My aim is to show that his analysis of modality is inconsistent with his metaphysics. I consider several ways of modifying the Lewisian analysis of modality, but argue that none are successful. I argue that the problem also affects theories related to genuine modal realism, including the stage theory of persistence and modal fictionalism.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  22. Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Functional Reduction.Michael Esfeld, Christian Sachse & Patrice Soom - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):217-230.
    This paper points out the merit of Nagelian reduction, namely to propose a model of inter-theoretic reduction that retains the scientific quality of the reduced theory and the merit of functional reduction, namely to take multiple realization into account and to offer reductive explanations. By considering Lewis and Kim’s proposal for local reductions, we establish that functional reduction fails to achieve a theory reduction and cannot retain the scientific quality of the reduced theory. We improve on that proposal by showing (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  52
    Reduction Without Elimination: Mental Disorders as Causally Efficacious Properties.Gottfried Vosgerau & Patrice Soom - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (2):311-330.
    We argue that any account of mental disorders that meets the desideratum of assigning causal efficacy to mental disorders faces the so-called “causal exclusion problem”. We argue that fully reductive accounts solve this problem but run into the problem of multiple realizability. Recently advocated symptom-network approaches avoid the problem of multiple realizability, but they also run into the causal exclusion problem. Based on a critical analysis of these accounts, we will present our own account according to which mental disorders are (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Hintikka and Cresswell on Logical Omniscience.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 15 (3):325-354.
    I discuss three ways of responding to the logical omniscience problems faced by traditional ‘possible worlds’ epistemic logics. Two of these responses were put forward by Hintikka and the third by Cresswell; all three have been influential in the literature on epistemic logic. I show that both of Hintikka's responses fail and present some problems for Cresswell’s. Although Cresswell's approach can be amended to avoid certain unpalatable consequences, the resulting formal framework collapses to a sentential model of knowledge, which defenders (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  25. The Content of Deduction.Mark Jago - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.
    For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  26. Essential bundle theory and modality.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese 198 (S6):1439-1454.
    Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties. On the traditional approach, these are the properties possessed by that material object. That view faces a deep problem: it seems to say that all of an object’s properties are essential to it.Essential bundle theoryattempts to overcome this objection, by taking the bundle as a specification of the object’s essential properties only. In this paper, I show that essential bundle theory faces a variant of the objection. To avoid the problem, the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  27. Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions.Mark Jago - 2017 - Argumenta 2 (2):293-308.
    Propositions are often aligned with truth-conditions. The view is mistaken, since propositions discriminate where truth conditions do not. Propositions are hyperintensional: they are sensitive to necessarily equivalent differences. I investigate an alternative view on which propositions are truthmaker conditions, understood as sets of possible truthmakers. This requires making metaphysical sense of merely possible states of affairs. The theory that emerges illuminates the semantic phenomena of samesaying, subject matter, and aboutness.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28. Truthmaker account of propositions.Mark Jago - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.
  29. The Truthmaker Non-Maximalist's Dilemma.Mark Jago - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):903-918.
    Amongst those who feel the pull of the truthmaker principle (that truths require for their truth a truthmaker to exist), there is disagreement as to whether it applies to all truths or merely to some distinguished subset. Those in the latter camp, the non-maximalists, argue that there are no ducks in my bath is true not because of something’s existence, but because of the lack of ducks in my bath. Maximalists, by contrast, insist that truths are made true by something’s (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  30. Setting the Facts Straight.Mark Jago - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
    Substantial facts are not well-understood entities. Many philosophers object to their existence on this basis. Yet facts, if they can be understood, promise to do a lot of philosophical work: they can be used to construct theories of property possession and truthmaking, for example. Here, I give a formal theory of facts, including negative and logically complex facts. I provide a theory of reduction similar to that of the typed λ -calculus and use it to provide identity conditions for facts. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  31. Against Yagisawa's modal realism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):10-17.
    In his book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (2010), Takashi Yagisawa presents and argues for a novel and imaginative version of modal realism. It differs both from Lewis’s modal realism (Lewis 1986) and from actualists’ ersatz accounts (Adams 1974; Sider 2002). In this paper, I’ll present two arguments, each of which shows that Yagisawa’s metaphysics is incoherent. The first argument shows that the combination of Yagisawa’s metaphysics with impossibilia leads to triviality: every sentence whatsoever comes out true. This is (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  32. The cost of truthmaker maximalism.Mark Jago - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):460-474.
    According to truthmaker theory, particular truths are true in virtue of the existence of particular entities. Truthmaker maximalism holds that this is so for all truths. Negative existential and other ‘negative’ truths threaten the position. Despite this, maximalism is an appealing thesis for truthmaker theorists. This motivates interest in parsimonious maximalist theories, which do not posit extra entities for truthmaker duty. Such theories have been offered by David Lewis and Gideon Rosen, Ross Cameron, and Jonathan Schaffer. But these theories cannot (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  33. The Conjunction and Disjunction Theses.Mark Jago - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):411-415.
    Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues for the disjunction thesis but against the conjunction thesis. I argue that accepting the disjunction thesis undermines his argument against the conjunction thesis.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  34. Epistemic logic for rule-based agents.Mark Jago - 2009 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 18 (1):131-158.
    The logical omniscience problem, whereby standard models of epistemic logic treat an agent as believing all consequences of its beliefs and knowing whatever follows from what else it knows, has received plenty of attention in the literature. But many attempted solutions focus on a fairly narrow specification of the problem: avoiding the closure of belief or knowledge, rather than showing how the proposed logic is of philosophical interest or of use in computer science or artificial intelligence. Sentential epistemic logics, as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  35. Recent Work in Relevant Logic.Mark Jago - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):526-541.
    This paper surveys important work done in relevant logic in the past 10 years.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36.  97
    Knowing what it is.Mark Jago - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    Essentialists understand modal properties in terms of the essences of things. Given this view, it is natural to think that our knowledge of modality ultimately derives from our knowledge of the essences of things. Is that view plausible? Do we genuinely have knowledge of the essences of things, in a form substantial enough to ground our modal knowledge? The more we pack into the notion of essence to allow it to underpin modal properties, the harder it is to claim genuine (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. From nature to grounding.Mark Jago - 2011 - In . pp. 199-216.
    Grounding is a powerful metaphysical concept; yet there is widespread scepticism about the intelligibility of the notion. In this paper, I propose an account of an entity’s nature or essence, which I then use to provide grounding conditions for that entity. I claim that an understanding of an entity’s nature, together with an account of how logically complex entities are grounded, provides all we need to understand how that entity is grounded. This approach not only allows us to say what (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  38. Belief in truthmaker semantics.Mark Jago - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-24.
    Stephen Yablo has argued that ascriptions of belief and knowledge are sensitive to _subject matter_ and that theorising in such terms may help resolve philosophical questions about the semantics of such ascriptions. _Truthmaker semantics_ offers a way of theorising about subject matters. My main aim in this paper is to investigate what a semantics for knowledge or belief ascriptions might look like within truthmaker semantics. I then discuss what the resulting account might have to say about the problem of logical (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. On ways of being true.Mark Jago - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-16.
    There are many ways for truths to be true. How should we understand that idea? One is that there are different kinds of truth: the _ways_ are different truth-like properties. Another understanding is that a truth can be made true in different ways, by different kinds of entities. The former understanding supports alethic pluralism. But the latter can be understood as a kind of monism: truth is the existential property of having some truthmaker or other. On this view, the differences (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40. Constructing worlds.Mark Jago - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):59-74.
    You and I can differ in what we say, or believe, even though the things we say, or believe, are logically equivalent. Discussing what is said, or believed, requires notions of content which are finer-grained than sets of (metaphysically or logically) possible worlds. In this paper, I develop the approach to fine-grained content in terms of a space of possible and impossible worlds. I give a method for constructing ersatz worlds based on theory of substantial facts. I show how this (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  41.  19
    Conjunctive and Disjunctive Parts.Mark Jago - 2023 - In Federico L. G. Faroldi & Frederik Van De Putte (eds.), Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-classical Logic. Springer Verlag. pp. 167-188.
    Fine (J. Philos. Logic 46(6):625–674, 2017a) sets out a theory of content based on truthmaker semantics which distinguishes two kinds of consequence between contents. There is entailment, corresponding to the relationship between disjunct and disjunction, and there is containment, corresponding to the relationship between conjunctions and their conjuncts. Fine associates these with two notions of parthood: disjunctive and conjunctive. Conjunctive parthood is a very useful notion, allowing us to analyse partial content and partial truth. In this chapter, I extend the (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  42. Closure on knowability.Mark Jago - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):648-659.
  43. Rule-based and Resource-bounded: A New Look at Epistemic Logic.Mark Jago - unknown
    Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bounded agents and show that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  44. Imagine the possibilities: information without overload.Mark Jago - 2006 - Logique Et Analyse 49 (196):345–371.
    Information is often modelled as a set of relevant possibilities, treated as logically possible worlds. However, this has the unintuitive consequence that the logical consequences of an agent's information cannot be informative for that agent. There are many scenarios in which such consequences are clearly informative for the agent in question. Attempts to weaken the logic underlying each possible world are misguided. Instead, I provide a genuinely psychological notion of epistemic possibility and show how it can be captured in a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45.  25
    Organizations Appear More Unethical than Individuals.Arthur S. Jago & Jeffrey Pfeffer - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 160 (1):71-87.
    Both individuals and organizations can engage in unethical behaviors. Across six experiments, we examine how people’s ethical judgments are affected by whether the agent engaging in unethical action is a person or an organization. People believe organizations are more unethical than individuals, even when both agents engage in identical behaviors. Using both mediation and moderation analytical approaches, we find that this effect is explained by people’s beliefs that organizations produce more harm when behaving unethically, even when they do not, as (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46. Disjunctive Parts.Mark Jago - forthcoming - In Federico L. G. Faroldi & Frederik Van De Putte (eds.), Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Kit Fine. Springer.
    Fine (2017a) sets out a theory of content based on truthmaker semantics which distinguishes two kinds of consequence between contents. There is entailment, corresponding to the relationship between disjunct and disjunction, and there is containment, corresponding to the relationship between conjunctions and their conjuncts. Fine associates these with two notions of parthood: disjunctive and conjunctive. Conjunctive parthood is a very useful notion, allowing us to analyse partial content and partial truth. In this chapter, I extend the notion of disjunctive parthood (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47.  85
    Resource-bounded belief revision and contraction.Mark Jago - 2006 - In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer. pp. 141--154.
    Agents need to be able to change their beliefs; in particular, they should be able to contract or remove a certain belief in order to restore consistency to their set of beliefs, and revise their beliefs by incorporating a new belief which may be inconsistent with their previous beliefs. An influential theory of belief change proposed by Alchourron, G¨ardenfors and Makinson (AGM) [1] describes postulates which a rational belief revision and contraction operations should satisfy. The AGM postulates have been perceived (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  48. Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2008 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
  49. Private Schools and Queue‐jumping: A reply to White.Mark Jago & Ian James Kidd - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (5):1201-1205.
    John White (2016) defends the UK private school system from the accusation that it allows an unfair form of ‘queue jumping’ in university admissions. He offers two responses to this accusation, one based on considerations of harm, and one based on meritocratic distribution of university places. We will argue that neither response succeeds: the queue-jumping argument remains a powerful case against the private school system in the UK. We begin by briefly outlining the queue-jumping argument (§1), before evaluating White’s no-harm (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto & Mark Jago - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark Jago.
    Impossible Worlds focuses on an exciting new theory in philosophy, with applications in metaphysics, logic, and the theory of meaning. Its central topic is: how do we meaningfully talk and reason about situations which, unbeknownst to us, are impossible? This issue emerges as a central problem in contemporary philosophical accounts of meaning, information, knowledge, belief, fiction, conditionality, and counterfactual supposition. The book is written bytwo of the leading philosophers in the area and contains original research of relevance to professional philosophers (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
1 — 50 / 978